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Executive summary
This working paper summarises current and potential 
uses of earthquake science in disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) and resilience-building activities in Nepal. It is 
written for anyone with an interest in earthquake DRR 
in Nepal, in particular scientists who generate earthquake 
science and practitioners and policy-makers who could 
use it. The study has been undertaken as part of the 
Earthquakes without Frontiers (EwF) project, funded 
by the UK Natural Environment Research Council and 
Economic and Social Research Council. The project aims 
to support governments, non-governmental organisations 
and communities to build resilience to earthquakes and 
secondary hazards along the Alpine-Himalayan belt. 
It is focused on four case study countries: Nepal, the 
neighbouring Indian state of Bihar, Kazakhstan and China.
Nepal is a geologically active country with a long history 
of destructive earthquakes – most recently in the 2015 
Gorkha earthquake sequence. There have been substantial 
advances in the scientific understanding of earthquake 
hazard in Nepal, but it is not clear how that understanding 
has informed, or could inform, national and international 
investment in earthquake DRR activities, and to what 
effect. The aim of this paper is to understand the role that 
earthquake science plays in DRR policy and practice in 
Nepal by seeking answers to the following questions:
 • What earthquake science is used by DRR stakeholders 
in Nepal, and for what purpose?
 • To what extent is earthquake DRR policy and practice 
in line with current scientific knowledge?
 • Where and how is scientific knowledge seen as 
particularly useful for policy and practice, and where is 
it seen to be less useful and why?
 • What are the drivers of and constraints on the 
production and use of earthquake science?
 • Are there opportunities to better produce or broker 
scientific knowledge for policy and practice?
 • What effects could better use of earthquake science 
deliver, and to whom?
In January 2014, we conducted a set of interviews and 
focus group discussions with local scientists, engineers, 
urban planners and representatives of major donor and 
practitioner organisations that are involved in DRR 
activities in Nepal. We found that earthquake science 
is widely used by those responsible for DRR in Nepal. 
Much of this science, however, is very general, and for 
most users it is used to inform broad opinions or choices 
rather than specific plans. This under-utilisation happens 
in part because potential science users don’t know what 
science can say (and therefore what questions to ask), and 
because scientists don’t know what those potential users 
need. Many of the questions that are directly addressed 
by earthquake science are far removed from the questions 
of those involved in DRR. Where earthquake science does 
provide knowledge of direct relevance to DRR, the wider 
context around the DRR activity has at least as much 
influence on what can be done as the science itself.
We found that there is appreciable earthquake science 
capacity in Nepal, with expertise on both primary and 
secondary earthquake hazards. Local scientists are 
often less connected to DRR organisations (e.g. donors 
and NGOs) than are international scientists, leading to 
frustration and disengagement with the DRR process. 
We argue that science could be used both more often 
and more instrumentally within resilience work to guide 
and advance disaster preparedness and management, and to 
support DRR policy priorities and activities. These potential 
uses can be distinguished in terms of the primary end users:
 • Use of science by donors is focused primarily on 
advocacy for particular issues, reflecting the ultimate 
role of donor organisations in setting agendas and 
funding projects. There are clear opportunities for more 
instrumental uses of science in constructing business 
cases for intervention or investment, for example 
by informing the balance between urban and rural 
projects or justifying a focus on particular regions or 
hazards. However, the more space- and time-specific the 
application of science, the greater the emphasis on the 
precision and accuracy of the science.
 • For practitioners, there is considerable potential 
for earthquake science to be used more widely in 
community-based DRR initiatives. There is currently 
an over-reliance on local knowledge, which provides 
essential insight but also has important gaps, 
particularly around low-frequency, high-magnitude 
earthquakes. Some of these gaps could be filled 
by existing earthquake science, but it remains a 
considerable challenge to make that science available in 
a format or at a scale that is appropriate to community-
level activities.
 • Engineers and urban planners in Nepal are disconnected 
from earthquake science, in part as a legacy of where 
they were trained. There is a need for earthquake 
engineering, and some earthquake science, to be taught 
in the Nepal engineering curriculum as a way of 
strengthening the scientific knowledge that underpins safe 
construction practices and full implementation of seismic 
building codes. Greater application of earthquake science 
to engineering in practice, however, is complicated by 
a wider set of governance issues, such as building code 
implementation and oversight, lack of clarity over 
responsibilities for DRR, and prioritisation of disaster 
management over risk reduction. These are general global 
problems as well as being specific to Nepal.
Specific recommendations
We recommend the creation of a sustainable, government-
led science advisory group, composed of national and 
international earthquake scientists, which could be called 
upon by potential users from the DRR community for 
advice at every stage of the disaster cycle in Nepal. This 
group could help to condense and assess available scientific 
information on earthquake hazards.
To ensure that end users can draw on expertise from 
this group, and from earthquake science more generally, 
we recommend that the model of the Nepal Risk 
Reduction Consortium – an existing partnership between 
the Government of Nepal and the humanitarian and 
development community tasked with coordinating DRR 
activities in the country – be developed and extended as a 
way of ensuring explicit cooperation between government, 
donors and NGOs. This model provides a potential 
gateway for science to enter into DRR activities because it 
connects the relevant users and provides clear focus areas 
for engagement around a particular aspect of DRR, acting 
both as a conduit and as a point of contact for science and 
scientists. 
We also recommend that scenarios be used more 
widely for contingency and logistics planning, as a specific 
mechanism for allowing earthquake science to be taken 
up and utilised by a range of end users. These scenarios 
can allow exploration of different possibilities – for 
example, the effects of earthquake occurrence during 
day-time or night-time hours on casualties, or the impacts 
of structural retrofitting efforts that are focused on 
particular districts or particular building types. They 
also have the potential to identify possible impacts 
that are currently not considered, such as the effects of 
earthquake-triggered landslides or earthquake impacts in 
rural districts as well as urban areas. The scenarios would 
be most effective if they were consensus products from a 
science advisory group (as recommended above), including 
government representatives, that could provide a collective 
and authoritative voice, backed up by peer-reviewed 
earthquake science. 
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1. Introduction
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the role and 
use of science in disaster management and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) – from risk mitigation, preparedness 
and early warning, to emergency response, recovery and 
reconstruction (e.g. Alexander, 2007; UNISDR, 2015a). 
The onus is often placed on the scientists to make their 
science ‘useful, useable, and used’ (Boaz and Hayden, 
2002; UNISDR, 2013) and to communicate their research 
effectively to potential end users – in this case policy-
makers and practitioners engaged in disaster management 
and DRR. While there is a growing body of literature that 
recognises the influence of the political economy context 
on DRR decision-making and action (Jones et al., 2012; 
Jones et al. 2016), less consideration has been given to 
those end users – in particular, how they communicate 
their science needs and access the scientific information 
they require. In addition, while a number of case studies 
have been presented as examples of good practice in the 
use of science for DRR (e.g. UNISDR 2013; 2015a), little 
attention has been given to how science is used and the 
barriers to its potential wider use. In general, the case 
studies that do exist tend to focus on more frequent, visible 
or predictable hazards, such as flooding (e.g. Lane et al., 
2011; Cadag and Gaillard, 2012). Earthquakes present a 
particular challenge, given that they cannot be predicted, 
occur abruptly with no warning, have persistent long-term 
consequences, and occur infrequently relative to human 
lifetimes (Davies et al., 2015). Perhaps because of these 
issues, the specific uses, and limitations, of earthquake 
science in DRR have so far received little attention (Davies 
et al., 2015). The 2015 Nepal earthquake sequence, 
however, has highlighted the importance of addressing 
these challenges and of understanding how science is used 
in earthquake risk reduction policy and practice. That use, 
along with the factors that both drive and constrain the use 
of science, is the subject of this working paper. 
1.1 Aims and research questions
The aim of this paper is to understand the role that 
earthquake science plays, and could play, in DRR policy 
and practice in Nepal. By earthquake science, we mean 
the science of how and why earthquakes happen and the 
consequences of earthquakes for the natural environment 
and the people who live in it (see Annex A). We recognise 
that there are many different forms of knowledge and 
expertise, including scientific knowledge (e.g. in social 
science and engineering), practitioner knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge held by DRR professionals) and lay knowledge 
(e.g. knowledge held by communities and individuals) 
(Mercer, 2012). However, here we ask whether earthquake 
science in particular is being used to its full potential 
for DRR in Nepal, and what the main drivers of and 
constraints on the use of earthquake science might be. This 
understanding is a critical first step that must be taken 
before we can hope to design or facilitate stronger linkages 
between science and policy.
To address this aim, we seek answers to the 
following questions: 
 • What earthquake science is used by DRR stakeholders 
in Nepal, and for what purpose?
 • To what extent is earthquake DRR policy and practice 
in line with current scientific knowledge?
 • Where and how is scientific knowledge seen as 
particularly useful for policy and practice, and where is 
it seen to be less useful and why?
 • What are the drivers of and constraints on the 
production and use of earthquake science?
 • Are there opportunities to better produce or broker 
scientific knowledge for policy and practice?
 • What effects could better use of earthquake science 
deliver, and to whom?
1.2 Our focus
Nepal has a very high level of seismic hazard and a 
long history of destructive earthquakes. DRR in Nepal 
is governed by, and involves, a complex network of 
actors and institutions, including both government 
(scientists and technical experts as well as bureaucrats) 
and non-government stakeholders. The latter include 
United Nations (UN) organisations, multi- and bilateral 
donor organisations, international and national non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), scientists and 
engineers (both consultants and university academics), the 
private sector and the population at large. This network 
creates a challenging context within which to examine 
the uses of science in policy and practice, due to the large 
number of actors that can potentially generate or use 
earthquake science. We focus our attention in particular 
on scientists as the producers of earthquake science, 
engineers working within earthquake risk reduction, 
UN organisations that are key players in earthquake 
preparedness and response in Nepal, donor organisations 
that fund DRR activities, NGOs that are implementing 
community-based DRR projects, and representatives of key 
government organisations. These groups are representative 
of the wider DRR decision-making community in Nepal. 
1.3 Our approach
To understand how earthquake science is used in 
DRR, and the drivers of and constraints on knowledge 
production and use, we conducted a series of focus 
group discussions in January 2014 with the following 
groups: scientists, engineers, UN organisations, donors 
and NGOs. We conducted follow-up interviews with 
government representatives from the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), the National 
Planning Commission, the Department of Mines and 
Geology (DMG) and the National Seismological Centre 
(NSC). We also drew on interviews with the Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MoHA) undertaken as part of a wider 
study on disaster risk governance in Nepal. In the focus 
groups, we were joined by 10 scientists, 8 donor officials 
(representing both multi- and bi-lateral organisations), 
8 NGO practitioners, 11 representatives from various 
UN organisations and five engineers. The focus groups 
and interviews were conducted in English, with the group 
discussions facilitated by both natural and social scientists 
in each case. Recordings of the focus group discussions and 
interviews were transcribed and coded thematically, with 
selected excerpts provided in the following sections. 
1.4 The 2015 Nepal earthquakes
The focus groups and interviews that underpin this 
work were conducted 15 months before the destructive 
sequence of earthquakes that hit Nepal in April and May 
2015. Most, if not all, of the participants in the study 
have been involved in the response and recovery effort 
following these earthquakes. The ways in which existing 
scientific knowledge and understanding were used to aid 
that effort, the new understanding that has resulted from 
the earthquake, and the opportunities and barriers to the 
uptake of earthquake science in response and recovery – 
while important issues in their own right – are beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on the themes and 
perspectives that emerged from the 2014 focus groups and 
interviews.
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Key terms
We define policy in its broadest sense to include 
content; procedures; behaviours; discourse; 
and attitudes (Jones and Villar, 2008; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998).
Governance refers to ‘the definition of issues, the 
formation of policies and the introduction of 
measures to mitigate undesirable consequences’ 
(Bulkeley and Mol, 2003: 144). Understanding the 
governance context for DRR therefore requires 
an understanding of the stakeholders involved 
(not only those engaged directly in DRR but also 
those from other, perhaps seemingly unrelated, 
sectors), the relationships among them and the role 
of power in these relationships; the institutional 
and legislative context for DRR; and the incentives 
and disincentives that affect the decisions of 
stakeholders engaged in DRR (Jones et al., 2016).
For other key terms relating to evidence-informed 
policy-making, see Annex B.
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2. Context and background
2.1 The governance of disaster risk 
reduction in Nepal
The governance landscape for DRR in Nepal is complex, 
involving a multitude of government and non-government 
actors. While the state is the centre of political power, the 
influence of international organisations is significant, with 
UN organisations and multi- and bilateral donors playing 
a substantial role in advancing the DRR agenda (Jones et 
al., 2014). This is unsurprising given the high dependency 
on development assistance, which accounts for about 26% 
of Nepal’s national budget (MoF, 2013). The range of 
DRR programmes underway in Nepal – from school and 
hospital retrofitting to community-based DRR activities 
– is impressive, particularly given the competing priorities 
and pressures in post-conflict Nepal (Jones et al., 2016). 
There remain, however, questions around government 
ownership of the DRR agenda (Jones et al., 2014; 2016).
The current legislation for disaster management, which 
dates back to the 1982 Natural Disaster Relief/Calamities 
Act, remains focused on response and relief. Although a 
new Act has been drafted with greater emphasis on DRR 
in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action (and the 
more recent Sendai Framework for DRR), its ratification 
has not been a priority for government. Disaster response 
and management therefore remains the responsibility of 
the MoHA. Given the growing international emphasis on 
DRR rather than disaster management, it has been argued 
that a position within a development ministry would be 
more appropriate, to enable the mainstreaming of DRR 
across development activities. In the absence of a revised 
Act, the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management 
– developed following a multi-stakeholder consultation 
process – has been guiding DRR in Nepal. Stakeholder 
coordination has been undertaken by the Nepal Risk 
Reduction Consortium (NRRC), a UN initiative which 
brings together the Government of Nepal and development 
and humanitarian partners, with the aim of reducing 
Nepal’s vulnerability to natural hazards. 
Some progress has been reported in local disaster 
management at the subnational level, with disaster 
preparedness plans developed in 67 out of 75 districts 
(MoHA, 2011). Guidelines have also been developed by 
MoFALD to support Local Disaster Risk Management 
Planning (LDRMP). However, while a growing number 
of Village Development Committees (VDCs) and 
municipalities are preparing plans, without the passing 
of the revised act few resources are available to support 
subnational DRR activities, limiting the action that can be 
taken. In addition, district-level government often lacks 
the capacity to support VDCs and municipalities in these 
planning processes.
2.2 Earthquake science in Nepal
We first review the state of scientific understanding of 
earthquakes in Nepal, and then describe the perspectives 
of the scientist focus group. Further information on 
earthquake science can be found in Annex A.
2.2.1. State of the art in earthquake science
Nepal is highly susceptible to earthquakes (Figure 1). The 
collision between the Indian and Eurasian plates has built the 
Himalayan mountain chain, and is accommodated primarily 
by slip on the Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT), which 
intersects the Earth’s surface along the mountain front in 
southern Nepal and northern India (Wesnousky et al., 1999).
Ongoing convergence between the Indian and Eurasian 
plates means that northern India is continuously moving 
towards central and northern Nepal at a rate of about 
18-20 mm per year (Ader et al., 2012). This means that 
after a period of about 500 years, the HFT needs to slip 
by about 9 m to accommodate the relative movement of 
the plates. If this 9 m of slip were to be released in a single 
earthquake, it would correspond to a Mw 8 event. If the 
Himalayan arc were to rupture only in Mw 8 earthquakes, 
which have a typical rupture length of around 200 to 300 
km, then up to 10 earthquakes would be needed to span 
the whole 2,000 km width of the arc (Bilham, 2004). As the 
return period for each of these earthquakes is about 500 
years, then one earthquake should be expected somewhere 
along the arc roughly every 50 to 70 years (Bilham, 2004). 
However, it should be noted that earthquakes do not follow 
a regular pattern over time, so they need not (and indeed, 
will not) be spaced exactly 50 years apart.
There have been eight earthquakes larger than Mw 7.5 
recorded since 1500 AD across the Himalayan arc, the 
largest of which was the Mw 8.5 Assam–Tibet earthquake 
in 1950. Kathmandu has been repeatedly damaged by 
large earthquakes, most notably in 1255 AD and 1408 
AD (Chitrakar and Pandey, 1986; Ader et al., 2012). 
Although ancient earthquake magnitudes are difficult to 
estimate, paleoseismological evidence suggests that the 
1255 AD earthquake was of a similar magnitude to the 
1934 Mw 8.1 earthquake (Sapkota et al., 2013). Some 
research has suggested that the discrepancy between relative 
plate motion and energy release in historical earthquakes 
along the Himalayan arc could be accounted for by 
unrecorded earthquakes of up to about Mw 9 (Ader et al., 
2012). Paleoseismological investigations suggest that two 
candidate Mw 9 earthquakes occurred around 1100 AD and 
1500 AD (Lavé et al., 2005; Kumar et al., 2006), although 
this is subject to debate (Sapkota et al., 2013). Regardless of 
whether such earthquakes have occurred, it is indisputable 
that earthquakes of greater than Mw 8 have occurred 
repeatedly in the past and should be expected in the future. 
Earthquakes could also occur on faults other than 
the HFT (Silver et al., 2015). This possibility means that 
seismic hazard estimated on the basis of the HFT alone 
may be somewhat underestimated, although the extent of 
this underestimation is very hard to determine at present. 
A probabilistic seismic hazard assessment specific 
to Nepal was first conducted in 1992 to inform the 
National Building Code, and was updated by Pandey et 
al. (2002). Seismic risk assessments have largely focused 
on the Kathmandu Valley: two studies (in 2000 and 
2007) used a repeat of the 1934 earthquake to illustrate 
current risk, while JICA (2002) examined a wider range of 
feasible scenarios drawing on findings from Pandey et al. 
(2002). The Nepal hazard risk assessment (ADPC, 2010) 
broadened the focus away from the Kathmandu Valley, 
drawing on the Pandey et al. (2002) hazard assessment and 
combining population, building type and infrastructure 
data with vulnerability data from past earthquakes to 
account for vulnerability and exposure. Table 1 summarises 
the main seismic hazard and risk assessments that have 
been undertaken for Nepal, including the development of 
specific earthquake scenarios. The reader is referred to the 
original reports and documentation for the specific results.
2.2.2. Earthquake science in Nepal from the  
perspective of local scientists
Nepali geologists are highly engaged with, and in many 
cases responsible for, much of the research on earthquake 
hazard across the Himalayan arc in general, and in Nepal 
in particular. Our focus group discussions revealed that, 
while local scientists are confident that they have a good 
knowledge of the surface locations of active faults, there is 
currently no single accepted fault map for Nepal. Members 
of the group were clear that, while fault locations are 
relevant to earthquake hazard, their surface expression 
provides only part of the picture, as faults dip under 
the surface. There was also consensus over which faults 
accommodate most of the slip and are associated with the 
largest and most frequent earthquakes. The group was 
unanimous in suggesting that the key outstanding research 
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Figure 1. Nepal’s active faults and approximate locations of slip patches in major historical earthquakes
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need is to determine the location, amount and date of slip in 
past earthquakes – for example through trenching and other 
paleoseismological investigations. From this knowledge, 
it should be possible to determine the magnitude and 
frequency of past earthquakes along the HFT, and indicate 
what might be expected in future. This has been done in 
detail for only short sections of the HFT, and the group felt 
that more research of this type was needed.
Generally, the scientists agreed that it is best to assume 
that the whole of Nepal has a high primary earthquake 
hazard. However, delineating the hazard was considered 
useful for some purposes, such as informing the National 
Building Code (NBC). There was universal consensus that 
the hazard map on which the NBC is based, formulated 
as part of the Building Code Development Project (Table 
1), represents a rigorous assessment of seismic hazard in 
Nepal. While some scientists expressed concern that the 
map may not reflect the state of the art of knowledge 
on Himalayan seismotectonics (e.g. the locations of all 
active faults), it was not clear what updates were needed 
based on this new understanding. Although the hazard 
map of Pandey et al. (2002) was mentioned as a rigorous 
assessment of seismic hazard, the group did not explicitly 
talk about this as an update of the NBC map. They were 
unfamiliar with the Nepal Hazard Risk Assessment map 
prepared by ADPC (2010) and were unsure about the 
methods that had been used to develop it, despite the map 
being based on the results of Pandey et al. (2002) and 
initiated by MoHA. The focus group participants expressed 
concern about the proliferation of seismic hazard maps, 
and called for a consensus-based hazard map for Nepal 
underpinned by the best available data.
There was extensive discussion within the group 
around appropriate methodologies for producing seismic 
hazard maps, including the problem of bias towards past 
earthquakes (the ‘bulls-eye effect’), the proper methodology 
for dealing with aftershocks and the importance of 
including earthquakes with epicentres outside Nepal. There 
was concern that, because hazard maps are largely based 
on historical earthquakes (both large and small), they can 
give a misleading picture that earthquake hazard is low 
in areas where few earthquakes have been recorded. The 
group emphasised that earthquakes are possible wherever 
there are active faults, regardless of historical earthquake 
activity. It was, however, unclear from the discussion 
whether areas of perceived low hazard in Nepal are due 
to the absence of previously identified active faults, the 
presence of creeping faults that slip continuously without 
generating earthquakes, or the absence of historical 
earthquakes in those areas. 
The group affirmed that the way that seismic waves 
propagate through different materials during an 
earthquake (i.e. attenuation and amplification) is important 
for building design. They acknowledged that some work 
has been done in this area, but recognised that such work 
is difficult to do properly because site effects are highly 
localised, requiring detailed knowledge of the material 
characteristics at a very fine scale. In terms of wider issues 
around earthquake risk, there was awareness among the 
group that hazard is only one component of risk and that 
it is necessary to also consider vulnerability. 
The group agreed that earthquake-triggered landslides 
are an important secondary hazard, but also agreed that 
the precise relationship – and thus the hazard – is not well 
understood. Earthquake-triggered landslides are an issue in 
all tectonically active mountain belts, with very few studies 
having been undertaken on earthquake-triggered landslides 
in the Himalaya specifically. Focus group participants 
recognised that landslides should be considered a dynamic 
rather than a static problem, in that forces on a hillslope 
change rapidly over the course of an earthquake and that 
ground motion will have implications for the stability of the 
hillslope. Many large landslides have been observed near 
active faults. But one participant suggested that that only 
earthquakes above Mw 8 trigger large landslides, and another 
noted that the 2011 Sikkim earthquake was not strong 
enough to trigger large landslides, though many shallow 
landslides were initiated. Another participant suggested, 
however, that it is difficult to determine the triggering 
mechanism of landslides based on their characteristics, 
such as size, depth and hillslope characteristics. These 
apparently conflicting views reflect an ongoing debate in the 
international community over whether the characteristics 
of landslides reflect the magnitude of the earthquake that 
triggered them. There was agreement, however, that the 
number and size of landslides increase with earthquake 
magnitude, with very few landslides triggered by earthquakes 
that are smaller than Mw 6.5.
In terms of the constraints on the generation of 
new earthquake science, the group noted that Nepali 
earthquake research is funded primarily through in-kind 
support from international research collaborators. There is 
some government funding available for monitoring, with 
the NSC maintaining a small network of seismometers. 
Beyond this, there is limited government funding other 
than for the salary costs of government scientists and 
university academics. Donors rarely fund earthquake 
science, whether nationally or internationally led.
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Table 1. Seismic hazard and risk assessments undertaken for Nepal
Year Project name Commissioned/ authored by Description
1992 Building Code 
Development Project 
Initiated by the Ministry of 
Housing and Physical Planning 
with assistance from the UNDP 
through the UN Centre for Housing 
Settlements (Beca International 
Consultants Ltd., New Zealand 
in conjunction with Nepali 
counterparts)
Aim: to assess the primary seismic hazard to inform the development of the first 
building code for Nepal. 
The project carried out a probabilistic seismic risk assessment of Nepal, including 
secondary hazards. It included all known active faults and earthquakes from 1255 
AD to 1992 AD and estimated surface acceleration (both PGA and for particular 
wave periods) using an empirical attenuation relationship. Results were reported 
for events with return periods of 50-1,000 years.
1992-1999 Global Seismic Hazard 
Assessment
Program (GSHAP)
Assessment of hazard for India and 
adjoining regions undertaken as 
part of GSHAP
Aim: to improve global standards in seismic hazard assessment and to assist 
national or regional agencies to identify locations where further detailed studies 
might be required (Giardini et al., 1999). Nepal was included as an adjoining 
country to India. 
Hazard was expressed in terms of PGA with a 10% chance of exceedance in 50 
years (corresponding to a return period of 475 years). The assessment suggested 
PGA values of up to 0.3 g for Nepal.
1997-2000 Kathmandu Valley 
Earthquake Risk 
Management Project 
(KVERMP)
Launched under the Asian Urban 
Disaster Mitigation Program 
implemented by NSET and 
Geohazards International
Aim: to reduce earthquake vulnerability in the Kathmandu Valley by evaluating the 
consequences of a repeat of the 1934 earthquake.
The hazard was taken from the 1934 earthquake. Vulnerability was calculated 
based on past vulnerability and changes in population density and building stock.
2002 Seismic hazard map 
of Nepal 
Pandey et al. (2002) Aim: to update probabilistic seismic hazard assessment maps for Nepal following 
seismic network development in the region since 1992. 
Hazard was expressed in terms of PGA at bedrock for a 475-year return period. 
This did not account for the influence of surface geology on the shaking. The 
assessment suggested PGA values of up to 0.4 g in northern Nepal.
2002 Earthquake Disaster 
Mitigation in the 
Kathmandu Valley 
Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA)/Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MoHA)
Aim: to estimate earthquake hazard for the Kathmandu Valley using four 
earthquake scenarios: (i) a mid-Nepal earthquake (surface-wave magnitude Ms 
8.0) filling the seismic gap identified by Pandey et al. (1999) between 82-85°E; 
(ii) a North Bagmati earthquake (Ms 6.0) to represent the small, frequent 
earthquakes that occur just north of the Kathmandu Valley; (iii) a local Kathmandu 
Valley earthquake (Ms 5.7); and (iv) a repeat of the 1934 Bihar-Nepal earthquake 
(Ms 8.4), which was included for comparison. Ground conditions were classified 
in order to evaluate amplification, liquefaction potential and slope stability. 
Hazard was expressed in terms of PGA for each scenario, and the results were 
used to estimate building losses, damage to infrastructure and casualties.
2007 Municipal Earthquake 
Risk Management 
Project
NSET, building on the KVERMP Aim: to develop an action plan for reducing risk using an earthquake scenario.
The project used a similar approach to the KVERMP. It was tested in the 
municipalities of Banepa, Dharan and Vyas.
2011 Nepal Hazard Risk 
Assessment
Initiated by MoHA and implemented 
by the Asian Disaster Preparedness 
Centre (ADPC), the Norwegian 
Geotechnical Institute and the 
Centre for International Studies and 
Cooperation, in consultation with 
local stakeholders
Aim: to develop a national hazard and risk profile for Nepal.
Seismic hazard was assessed in terms of Modified Mercalli Intensity for 50-year, 
100-year, 250-year and 500-year return periods for bedrock and based on the 
work of Pandey et al. (2002). An assessment of exposure, vulnerability and risk 
was also undertaken. 
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3. The use of earthquake 
science in DRR policy and 
practice
The focus group discussion with local scientists revealed 
a high level of engagement with, and knowledge of, 
earthquake science in Nepal. How, then, is this earthquake 
science used in earthquake risk reduction policy and 
practice? We consider the views expressed by each 
focus group in turn: representatives of major donor 
organisations, practitioners, representatives of various UN 
bodies, and engineers and urban planners. 
3.1. Donors
Multilateral and bilateral donor organisations are the 
primary funding source for earthquake risk reduction 
activities in Nepal. DRR advisors based within 
donor organisations are tasked with developing DRR 
programmes, securing funding within their organisation 
for these initiatives, and engaging national and local 
NGOs to deliver the programme activities. It was noted by 
one participant that DRR advisors are generalists rather 
than specialists, often with a development (social science) 
background. The nature of DRR means that on any one day 
an advisor can be dealing with climate change adaptation, 
building code implementation or emergency planning 
with local government. It could, therefore, be argued that 
breadth rather than depth of knowledge is required by DRR 
experts within donor organisations. Participants in the 
donor focus group demonstrated a basic understanding of 
earthquake hazard, including the causes of earthquakes and 
their secondary effects, such as landslides and liquefaction. 
Some participants were confused, unsurprisingly, by 
probabilities and return periods and were interested to 
know how earthquake probabilities are calculated and 
the likelihood of a high magnitude earthquake occurring 
in Nepal in any given year. Many participants cited the 
National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET) as 
the main source of such technical information. They were, 
however, relatively unaware of local scientists engaged 
in earthquake research that they could approach for this 
information. While this might reflect a range of constraints, 
one participant highlighted the role of gate-keepers 
who may have vested interests in preventing scientific 
information from being shared. 
Participants were generally aware of the limitations 
of earthquake science, recognising, for example, that 
earthquakes cannot be predicted. As a result, there was a 
feeling among some of the participants that they probably 
know all they need to know about earthquakes for the 
purposes of DRR, and that closer engagement with Earth 
scientists is unlikely to influence their programming and 
activities. This perhaps reflects the more widely held 
perception articulated by the former Head of the UN 
Mission in Nepal, Robert Piper, that ‘addressing Nepal’s 
vulnerability to natural hazards is first a governance 
problem, and only second, about funding and expertise’ 
(Piper, 2013). As a result, earthquake science is largely used 
politically by donors to persuade people or to influence 
their behaviour, both internally within donor organisations 
and externally in the interactions between organisations 
and government. For instance, participants indicated that 
donor organisations draw on earthquake ‘facts’ in business 
case development to make the case for earthquake risk 
reduction programmes within their organisation. Such facts 
have been used to illustrate the vulnerability of Kathmandu 
in relation to other cities in South Asia, the number of 
people potentially exposed to intensity VIII shaking and the 
potential loss of life, as well as the impact on development 
gains in the country. Donor agencies also use these facts in 
advocacy to keep earthquake risk reduction on the agendas 
of the Government of Nepal, the donor community and 
NGOs. Given this, there was a sense among the group 
that cutting-edge science is less important for their 
purposes than new ‘popular facts’ (e.g. headline numbers 
on potential earthquake impacts, or global rankings of 
earthquake risk) to keep the stakeholders engaged – with 
advocacy based largely on those facts and on the emotional 
response that they produce. As one participant explained, 
the NRRC – a partnership between government and the 
humanitarian and development community that is charged 
with coordinating DRR activities – has been active since 
2011 and repeatedly uses the same material in speeches 
to make the case for more funding for earthquake risk 
reduction. It was noted that it is becoming harder and 
harder to maintain stakeholder interest. 
At the same time, there was awareness that DRR 
programmes could be more rigorously underpinned by 
science. As a representative from a donor organisation 
explained in a separate interview: ‘I’ve never really seen 
a seismic expert come in and say this is the seismic risk, 
the likely scenarios, the areas affected.’ Further to this, 
participants expressed concern that programming decisions 
might be underpinned by science that has not been subject 
to rigorous and independent review. Existing products like 
the JICA (2002) earthquake report, which explores a series 
of earthquake scenarios impacting the Kathmandu Valley 
and which was well known by the donor representatives, 
could provide at least some of this information. However, 
the donor agencies do not always have the expertise to use 
this more instrumentally in their programme design and 
implementation. This provides a clear example of how 
existing – and widely accepted – earthquake science is 
not being used effectively in DRR programming, perhaps 
because the donor agencies lack the capacity to make full 
use of the information. 
Where knowledge gaps are identified by donors, 
research is commissioned. This research is highly targeted 
and policy focused. For example, the Nationwide Risk 
Assessment being commissioned by the NRRC has been 
designed to shape the future DRR agenda in Nepal 
through the identification of priority areas for research 
and action. Aware that an extensive body of research 
on hazard and vulnerability already exists in Nepal, the 
NRRC began with a ‘stock-taking exercise’ to provide an 
overview of what is known, and to identify where the gaps 
in knowledge lie and where new or updated research could 
usefully be commissioned. The donor representatives noted 
that keeping a handle on the research being undertaken by 
the multiple donor and practitioner organisations in Nepal 
is a major challenge – findings and outputs from research 
programmes often go unshared, or get lost over time as 
personnel and priorities within organisations change. 
This can result in similar research being commissioned 
by multiple donor organisations, with donors focusing 
on the short term rather than investing in research that 
is useful for all engaged stakeholders beyond the life of a 
specific project. Donors fund research that will provide 
a knowledge base upon which decisions are made and 
resource usage justified. They are less likely to fund ‘blue 
skies’ research that has little relevance to operational 
planning, though this is the science upon which earthquake 
facts are based. 
3.2 Practitioners
The practitioner focus group included representatives from 
international and national NGOs and other stakeholders 
who are engaged directly in the implementation of DRR 
projects. Unlike the DRR representatives within the donor 
organisations, practitioners were reflecting on the work 
of their organisations at the local or community level, and 
this was reflected in the way they use scientific information 
to support their DRR programmes. Participants in 
the practitioner focus group demonstrated a good 
understanding of earthquake hazard and risk, including 
why earthquakes happen in Nepal, their potential 
consequences and possible preparedness measures. As well 
as magnitude, the group recognised the importance of 
geology in determining localised shaking and intensity, and 
the impact of this shaking in terms of potential damage 
to buildings and loss of life. They were also aware that 
high-magnitude earthquakes can still occur in areas of 
seemingly low seismic hazard, viewing seismic hazard 
maps with healthy scepticism. The potential for landslides 
to be triggered by earthquake events was also recognised, 
with participants acknowledging that landslides can cause 
more damage than the earthquake itself, especially in 
rural areas of Nepal. There was some confusion in the 
group around earthquake probabilities and return periods, 
and therefore what the published hazard maps show. 
Participants spoke of a ‘70-year rule’, suggesting that a 
high-magnitude earthquake will occur in the Kathmandu 
Valley every 70 years. The fact that there had not been (at 
that time) a major earthquake in the valley since 1934, a 
span of 80 years, was therefore a cause for concern for 
some participants, who asked whether Nepal was ‘overdue’ 
an earthquake. While there is no scientific basis for this 
idea (Annex A), it is both widely reported and remarkably 
persistent and has provided some impetus for preparation. 
There was agreement among the practitioner 
representatives that active faults are located throughout 
Nepal and that as a result, earthquakes could happen 
anywhere, leading to high seismic hazard across all of 
Nepal. Vulnerability to earthquakes, on the other hand, 
was seen to vary spatially and was thought to depend on 
a range of factors, including concentrations of people, 
poverty and inequality. The representatives felt strongly 
that addressing vulnerability was the key to reducing 
earthquake risk in Nepal. Vulnerability is therefore the 
main focus of NGO-led, community-based DRR initiatives. 
The practitioners involved in the focus group discussion 
were largely engaged in DRR activities at the local or 
community level. As a result, some of the focus group 
participants were less familiar with national-scale hazard 
maps published by the ADPC, UNOCHA and others. 
Participants who had been engaged in more strategic-level 
planning were aware of these maps and associated reports 
– JICA (2002) was cited as a key resource – and used 
them in much the same way as the donor representatives 
– conceptually or indirectly, to inform their programmes 
of work (e.g. in prioritising the retrofitting of schools 
over other activities); and politically, to illustrate Nepal’s 
susceptibility to earthquakes for funding purposes and to 
prompt action by national and local government. However, 
national-scale hazard maps were unanimously considered 
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to be of limited use to NGOs engaged in community-based 
DRR. For scientific knowledge (such as a hazard map) to 
be usefully applied by practitioners, it would need to be 
available at a much finer scale that allowed delineation of 
hazards across a community, rather than assigning that 
community a single value or classification. Even then, as 
one participant explained: 
‘I think these kinds of [hazard] maps would be of 
limited use … vulnerability is largely related to what’s 
there and what’s built … I think the vulnerability is less 
related to this kind of stuff, and this kind of mapping, 
than the mapping which goes on above the ground – the 
physical conditions [i.e. vulnerability of building stock] 
and so on. So when we go and work with communities, 
that is what we try to do.’ 
Perhaps surprisingly, national-scale hazard maps were 
found to play little or no role in the selection of areas 
where NGOs undertake community-based DRR projects, 
reflecting the range of criteria that are used explicitly and 
implicitly to decide where to work. 
Current approaches to community-based DRR by 
practitioners in Nepal are generally based on local 
knowledge, with minimal scientific input. The rationale 
behind this is that people have a good knowledge of 
the physical environment in which they live, and it is 
possible to see the vulnerability in the built environment 
(such as poorly constructed buildings) without additional 
scientific input. Focus group participants were aware that 
the intensity of shaking in a major earthquake will vary 
spatially, and that secondary hazards will be a widespread 
problem in rural areas, but this knowledge did not seem 
to impact their practice and was not seen as especially 
relevant for their activities. 
Some studies have suggested, however, that there are 
likely to be local knowledge gaps around the occurrence of 
rare events like earthquakes and their links with secondary 
hazards, including landslides. As a result, these hazards 
may not be included, or adequately recognised, in locally 
driven vulnerability assessments. There may therefore be 
important limits to the level of community preparedness for, 
or resilience to, this type of infrequent hazard. Communities 
may also be unaware of the availability of more detailed 
and potentially relevant scientific information, such as 
localised geology and liquefaction potential. Instead, 
practitioner representatives described how they used basic 
science conceptually, to raise awareness of earthquake 
hazards at the community level and to address knowledge 
gaps and misunderstandings – for example, regarding 
the potential for earthquake activity. As one participant 
noted: ‘We’re getting much more basic – we’re trying to 
get them [the community] to understand there is a serious 
threat here.’ A more scientific or technical understanding 
was considered less relevant to community-based DRR 
activities. For example, one NGO had attempted to use 
the RADIUS tool, which is designed to provide practical 
guidance on assessing seismic vulnerability, but found it to 
be complicated and difficult to apply.
3.3. UN organisations
The UN focus group members talked much more about 
the instrumental uses of scientific knowledge than those 
in other groups, reflecting the direct engagement and 
responsibilities of the focus group participants in disaster 
preparedness and response planning. Aware that an 
earthquake could occur at any time, participants talked 
about the need to be as prepared as possible. At the time 
that the focus groups were held, UN organisations were 
preparing for a repeat of the 1934 Mw 8.1 earthquake 
with a focus on the Kathmandu Valley, the rationale being 
that this is the most densely populated city in Nepal and 
therefore the highest priority. In planning for a Kathmandu 
Valley earthquake, the UN agencies rely on ‘observations 
and experience of [the] 1934 earthquake’ along with 
experiences in other earthquakes in the region and 
internationally. As one participant explained, ‘it’s a question 
of logistics’ to get water, food and non-food items into the 
affected areas as quickly as possible, as well as the necessary 
equipment to support the response and recovery effort. 
While the focus group participants were aware of the 
earthquake scenarios prepared by JICA (2002), it was not 
clear how these scenarios are used in disaster response 
planning. Instead, the participants made reference to two 
more practical scenarios: one in which the Kathmandu 
airport is functional, allowing international aid to arrive 
by plane; and another in which the runway is damaged, 
requiring the use of helicopters in the immediate aftermath. 
Overland aid routes have been mapped (including 
bridges and their susceptibility to collapse in the event 
of an earthquake) and plans have been developed for the 
movement of aid from the port of Kolkata in northeast 
India into Nepal. While access to the valley was identified 
as a priority, little consideration has been given to potential 
landslide hazard, which could block the arterial road 
corridors from China to the north and India to the south. 
Members of the group reported that very little information 
about the secondary effects associated with earthquakes 
was available, and this was identified as a potential area 
where earthquake science could make a useful contribution 
to disaster response planning. 
Within the Kathmandu Valley, UN agencies use ‘risk’ 
maps to identify the areas of the city that are likely to be 
most severely affected, for example from building collapse. 
For this, they draw on the expertise of technical ministries in 
the Government of Nepal, principally the Ministry of Urban 
Development, which is currently preparing land use maps 
for the valley. The International Organization for Migration, 
working with MoHA, has identified open spaces in the 
Kathmandu Valley that could be used for humanitarian 
purposes in the event of an earthquake (MoHA and IOM, 
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2013); working with MoFALD, it has also developed a 
debris management plan to enable the roads to be cleared 
and opened as quickly as possible (MoFALD, 2014). 
In terms of earthquake science, it was noted that 
‘tectonics’ and ‘geomorphology’ were new and unfamiliar 
terms for the focus group participants. The group explained 
that while there are a small number of earthquake experts 
in Nepal, they have limited involvement in disaster 
response planning. Instead, participants go to them ‘when 
we really want to have a kind of updated knowledge of 
[an] earthquake’. The NSC provides information following 
an earthquake, including magnitude and epicentral 
location. However, participants noted that they use the 
US Geological Survey (USGS) National Earthquake 
Information Center to ‘really be updated’, aware that the 
USGS is often quicker at reporting earthquake events. 
Participants were aware that geological maps are available, 
along with maps showing the liquefaction hazard for the 
Kathmandu Valley (both through the DMG), but noted 
that this information does not currently inform disaster 
response planning. This is perhaps surprising, given the 
group’s awareness that earthquakes can have highly 
localised effects depending on geology. 
Focus group participants could certainly see the value 
of scientific expertise, for example in trying to understand 
the causes of the Seti floods in Pokhara in 2012. A 
UNICEF-led water, sanitation and health (WASH) project 
is also drawing on scientific expertise to locate wells to 
provide a supply of water during emergency situations. 
However, in general it was noted that academic research 
is rarely shared beyond the academic community, with 
academics rarely approaching government with their data 
and findings. When it is shared, communication can be a 
challenge. On the other side, research is commissioned by 
the development sector when required (as with donors, this 
is policy focused). As one participant explained, research 
is needs based – when you need it, you collect it: ‘There 
is no continuous, systematic effort [research programme] 
put in place either by development partners or by the 
government agencies.’ One participant highlighted that this 
disempowers local research institutions. It was noted that 
in recent years there has been a growing awareness on the 
part of government and development agencies of the value 
of local research institutes in development planning. It was 
not evident, however, whether this awareness had led to any 
widespread instrumental changes in the planning process.
3.4 Engineers, architects and  
urban planners
This focus group included representatives from 
professional bodies engaged in earthquake engineering. 
The discussion indicated that there is generally a high 
level of awareness of Nepal’s susceptibility to earthquakes 
and secondary hazards amongst engineers and urban 
planners, with particular emphasis on urban hazards 
such as fire associated with gas and electricity. Reference 
was also made to landslides and to flooding associated 
with the blocking of rivers by landslides. The engineers 
noted that scientific information is available about the 
earthquake hazard context in Nepal, such as fault maps 
and liquefaction maps. There were concerns, however, 
regarding the accuracy of the information available, which 
was described as ‘good for bringing awareness but for 
actual practicing they are not accurate’. In some cases, 
the data were considered to be out of date; in other cases, 
it was felt that the outputs were at the wrong scale to 
usefully inform earthquake engineering.
As practicing engineers and urban planners, the group 
shared examples of how earthquake science has been, 
and could be, used instrumentally in urban planning and 
building code development. They also recognised the social 
vulnerability and policy contexts in which earthquake risk 
reduction is being undertaken in Nepal and the barriers 
faced in DRR implementation. The engineers, then, had a 
very broad understanding of the problem: ‘only knowing 
the [physical] hazard is not enough’. 
A key issue raised was the lack of urban planning in 
Nepal and the challenges associated with designing and 
implementing urban plans retrospectively once a city exists. 
One major contributing factor to what one participant 
called ‘the community planned cities’, where planning is led 
by the community with no technical input from specialists 
in the field of urban planning, was the Maoist insurgency. 
The insurgency led people to migrate from conflict-affected 
rural areas to the cities: ‘they [rural migrants] purchased 
land, they built houses without thinking will they get 
proper road, proper water supply, proper electricity. They 
just went for the safety – safety from the conflicts that 
were happening in the villages.’ As a result, the growing 
cities ‘brought us another wave of hazard, I should say 
social hazard’. The situation has been compounded by the 
absence of a stable government in the conflict and post-
conflict periods. 
There were also concerns about the core areas of 
established cities, such as Kathmandu Metropolitan 
City, which are densely settled. These areas, with their 
combination of old heritage buildings and new concrete 
constructions, present a significant challenge for urban 
planners, architects and engineers. There is also evidence 
of new settlements being constructed outside the main 
cities on floodplains, highlighting the need for risk-sensitive 
land-use planning. 
While some of the focus group participants had 
contributed to the development of the NBC, the group noted 
that implementation of the code is not mandatory – under 
the Local Self Governance Act, municipalities are free to 
decide whether to implement the NBC. In addition, the code 
does not apply to the large number of rapidly expanding 
VDCs which formally have village status. It was felt that 
capacity building is very much needed at the municipal 
level in order to implement the building code. There were 
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particular concerns among the focus group participants 
that, despite 3,000 new engineers graduating in Nepal 
each year, the country does not retain enough engineers to 
facilitate building code implementation. In the absence of 
jobs, many engineers travel abroad for employment. The 
same trend was observed for masons trained in earthquake-
safe construction practices, who, having completed the 
training course, can demand higher wages from employers 
overseas. While masons who are trained in earthquake-safe 
construction can charge more for house construction in 
Nepal, feedback from masons suggests that currently there is 
a lack of demand from the public. 
The focus group participants felt strongly that the NBC 
requires updating. In particular, the Nepal Engineers’ 
Association has proposed that Nepal adopt a standard 
international building code that would be adapted for 
Nepal and regularly updated. This could address some 
of the reported deficiencies in the NBC. For example, 
the ‘Mandatory Rules of Thumb’ (MRT) component, 
which specifies elements such as column size, beam size, 
reinforcement, and partitions, is designed to guide the 
construction of concrete and masonry buildings. The 
MRT are rarely followed in full, however, with poor 
quality designs compounded by poor construction. As a 
result, the engineers suggested that the MRT be replaced 
with standard designs for masons to copy. It was also 
suggested that a new government body be set up to oversee 
the updating of the NBC and its implementation. This 
is currently the responsibility of a small section within 
the Department of Urban Development and Building 
Construction – a large department with a broad remit. It 
was recognised that this section had limited capacity, was 
largely focused on urban development, and was isolated 
from construction efforts overseen by other ministries, 
including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Health and Population, MoFALD, MoHA and the military. 
For these reasons, the group suggested that responsibility 
for the NBC should lie with an independent institution. 
The focus group participants identified an urgent need 
to train more engineers to understand the NBC and to 
apply it in their projects. While courses in earthquake 
engineering are increasingly being offered through 
universities in Nepal, the focus group participants felt that 
this wasn’t enough. ‘We need to intensify the knowledge 
sharing and practicing … between the engineers, architects 
and planners.’ In particular, knowledge of earthquake 
science was considered to be limited amongst architects 
and planners, who tend to learn through their professional 
development. With international funding, the Nepal 
Engineers’ Association has collaborated with NSET to 
offer training to engineers in vulnerability assessment. 
There is evident interest and demand from within the 
engineering community, but a lack of funding was 
identified as the main constraint. 
It was also noted that currently there is no appropriate 
building code for bridges, hydropower or other 
infrastructure projects. In some cases, in particular large-
scale infrastructure projects such as hydropower dams, 
international codes are used to guide their construction. 
This was seen as a particular concern for projects that are 
implemented by district or municipal governments, who 
may lack the necessary expertise to promote these codes 
and to ensure their implementation. 
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4. Drivers and constraints 
for using earthquake 
science
In this chapter, we use the focus group discussions and 
interviews to summarise the major sources of demand for and 
supply of earthquake science in Nepal, along with the factors 
that promote or constrain its use in DRR policy and practice. 
4.1 Demand and the drivers of use
Overall, there seems to be a low demand for earthquake 
science among the DRR community, possibly coinciding 
with low awareness of what might be offered and what 
its value might be. As one participant asked, ‘What can 
you tell us beyond all of Nepal is high hazard?’ There 
were some examples, however, of a ‘demonstration effect’ 
where the use of science itself created further demand. For 
example, many participants identified the JICA (2002) 
scenario as a useful source of information (Table 1), 
which has driven a demand among some stakeholders for 
updated or refined hazard information.
DRR is often under-prioritised internationally 
(Wilkinson, 2012) as it typically involves actions (e.g. 
retrofitting key infrastructure and implementing building 
codes) that have very limited short-term or visible 
payoffs, in a context where governments and citizens have 
many other pressing issues to deal with on a daily basis. 
Earthquakes are particularly problematic because they 
occur so infrequently, even in a seismically active country 
like Nepal, making them a low-priority issue compared 
to daily or short-term livelihood concerns. Given the 
consistent dialogue efforts (and funding) of international 
development partners on the issue, however, low awareness 
seems insufficient to explain Nepali politicians’ reticence 
to focus on earthquake risk reduction and the limited 
implementation of non-externally funded work. Instead, 
this reticence likely stems from (1) short-termism, 
particularly in the transitional phase since 2007, with 
political attention largely focused on constitutional issues 
following the end of the decade-long civil conflict; (2) lack 
of political incentives and limited evidence of demand 
from the voting public for earthquake risk reduction; and 
(3) cultural issues, with some interviewees suggesting that 
a prevailing ‘fatalism’ may also have a role in views on 
disasters.
Earthquake science is used selectively by government 
for earthquake risk reduction, and predominantly where 
there are resources attached. This follows partly from 
the low political prioritisation of earthquakes, and low 
institutional capacity for gathering or assessing scientific 
information. Some scientific information is likely to be 
demanded in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake 
(e.g. its location and magnitude) for the recovery effort. 
However, there are very few examples of government 
demand or funding for science to inform earthquake 
preparedness and risk reduction. The exception to this 
is demand from government for research and analysis to 
inform its submissions to international DRR initiatives of 
which Nepal is a signatory, such as the Hyogo and Sendai 
frameworks (UNISDR, 2005; 2015b).
The demand that does exist in government is 
uncoordinated and poorly communicated. As in many 
countries, responsibilities for DRR within the Government 
of Nepal are complicated, with multiple agencies and 
overlapping and confused mandates. As an example, the 
focus group discussions identified the Ministry of Urban 
Development (MoUD) as the technical ministry that 
provides guidance to municipalities on earthquake-safe 
construction and building code implementation. However, 
municipalities currently sit under MoFALD and, as a result, 
MoUD has no jurisdiction to enforce the building code. 
Institutional overlap and coordination challenges in Nepal 
are exacerbated by unstable coalition governments and the 
fragmented nature of politics and society. Governmental 
positions are often divided up to reinforce patronage 
networks, and individuals in those positions have minimal 
incentives to take a long-term view of problems as they 
are unlikely to remain in their posts for more than a few 
months (Jones, 2010; Basnett et al., 2014). Even where 
this is not the case, incentives to accumulate rewards and 
maintain ties of reciprocity, given short time horizons, 
override incentives to demand robust information and 
make well-informed decisions (Jones et al., 2016).
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In contrast, earthquake risk reduction is a priority for 
many donors, leading to relatively strong but fragmented 
demand for knowledge in general, but little demand for 
earthquake science in particular. The focus on evidence-
informed planning by donors (e.g. DFID, 2009) indicates 
that there is a considerable demand for analytical products 
to inform programming and policy dialogue. This reflects 
both a higher capacity to commission and interpret 
research in donor organisations than in government, and 
also incentives for the production and use of evidence in 
decision-making processes. The demand from donors is 
predominantly for scientific knowledge that can be used 
politically (e.g. for justifying a focus on earthquakes). 
Demand for instrumental uses of earthquake science is 
limited; some donor representatives in our focus group 
did not see how earthquake science could add value or 
usefully shape their programming, with earthquake risk 
reduction seen mainly as a governance problem. Multiple 
donor organisations with overlapping remits often have very 
similar evidence demands. However, lack of communication 
and coordination, issues of quality control (due, for example, 
to a lack of transparency of methods or unavailability of 
underpinning data), and constraints on the dissemination 
and use of research products result in considerable 
duplication. Thus, for example, multiple seismic hazard 
maps have recently been commissioned and published by 
different donors, leading to widespread repetition of similar 
scientific outputs and confusion among users.
It is also important to recognise that donor organisations 
may not have the in-house expertise to use earthquake 
science instrumentally in their decision-making. DRR experts 
within donor organisations are generalists rather than 
specialists, and may not have a natural science background. 
This highlights the need for more effective communication 
between technical experts and potential users of scientific 
information, but also prioritisation by donors and 
engagement with what earthquake science can provide. 
This requires relationships of trust to be built in order to 
capitalise on limited opportunities for communication.
Constraints on long-term donor engagement produce a 
further limitation on demand. While there are numerous 
donor-funded initiatives that have made some important 
progress, they typically proceed without significant 
government buy-in or ownership, with actions usually only 
implemented when they come with additional funding 
attached. There are thus limited incentives for donor-
funded initiatives to take the kind of sustained action on 
earthquake risk reduction that could usefully incorporate, 
and benefit from, earthquake science. 
Demand for earthquake science from both donors 
and practitioners is practically limited by the low spatial 
resolution of the most common scientific products. 
Outputs such as national-scale hazard maps were 
uniformly judged to be of limited use in designing or 
implementing earthquake risk reduction programmes. Even 
high-level usage, such as selection of areas for particular 
programmes or interventions, is not common, most likely 
reflecting wider political constraints on decision-making. 
Earthquake scientists therefore need to be aware of the 
very limited usefulness and usability of such products.
At the community level, demand for earthquake 
science is variable, and is highly dependent on experience. 
Various examples were given in the focus groups of 
local government and communities taking earthquake 
risk reduction seriously in areas that have recently felt 
medium-sized earthquakes. For example, following the 
1988 earthquake, Dharan municipality with NGO support 
began a building code implementation programme.
There is potential, but unrealised, demand for 
earthquake science in local disaster risk management 
planning. Under the guidance of MoFALD, municipalities, 
districts and VDCs are required to develop a Local Disaster 
Risk Management Plans. This involves an assessment 
of the hazards and risks faced by the community and 
an action plan for how these will be addressed. These 
plans are largely based on local knowledge and expertise, 
however, with limited technical input or instrumental 
use of earthquake science. This could reflect the limited 
availability of scientific expertise outside Kathmandu, the 
governance issues raised earlier, the belief that community 
knowledge is best placed to address the problem and 
that earthquake science has little to add, or a lack of 
understanding of what earthquake science can offer.
Demand for earthquake science is also limited by a 
lack of implementation of government policy. In many 
countries, building codes are one of the main drivers of 
demand for earthquake science. In Nepal, municipalities 
decide whether or not they will implement the NBC. For 
those municipalities that do, building designs must be 
signed off by municipal engineers but some participants 
reported that individuals and the private sector have 
relatively low interest in enforcing the building code. 
This reflects a combination of a low level of awareness of 
earthquake risk, low levels of knowledge of earthquake-
safe construction practices, and concern around the 
perceived extra cost among individuals. When combined 
with limited capacity and corruption on the part of local 
government, this leads to formal sign-offs being given to 
inadequate designs. The requirement of government sign-
off has had some impact; however, property developers 
reportedly favour building projects in urbanising VDCs 
where no sign-off is required. Furthermore, there is 
limited monitoring of whether approved building designs 
are implemented in practice, or of the quality of building 
materials. There is also limited land use planning or 
zoning carried out by local government in Nepal, with 
urban development typically proceeding in a haphazard, 
unplanned and often unsafe manner.
An underdeveloped insurance industry also reduces 
the demand for earthquake science. In some countries, 
the potential to take out earthquake insurance, or the 
requirement to check various aspects of the safety and 
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longevity of properties for buildings insurance, drives 
the demand for and the use of scientific understanding 
of earthquakes. Participants reported that the insurance 
industry in Nepal is relatively limited, although some 
reported that some banks are beginning to require building 
design sign-off and evidence of building code compliance 
before approving loans for property construction.
There are, however, emerging signs of demand for 
earthquake science from the private sector. As some 
Nepali businesses grow and reach a reasonable level of 
size and maturity, there is a nascent but growing interest 
in contingency and continuity planning, and in turn for 
earthquake risk reduction expertise. Participants reported 
that banks are beginning to demand that their buildings 
are safe. In the tourism sector, the more successful 
businesses are increasingly being pressured to upgrade 
the safety of their buildings in order to comply with 
international standards – for example, European tour 
agents are required to ensure that they only send tourists to 
earthquake-resistant hotels.
4.2 Supply and the drivers of  
knowledge production
Consultancies are the primary suppliers of policy-relevant 
knowledge, which is driven by donor demand. There are 
barriers to consultants who wish to build on previous 
work, including a lack of incentives to avoid repetition 
and practical issues such as the loss of research when the 
programmes that commissioned it come to an end. Work is 
carried out to meet specific programming needs, meaning 
that some issues are effectively ‘off the agenda’ due to 
decisions already being taken. For example, the focus 
areas for programmes are often decided long before any 
assessment of risk and vulnerability is undertaken, because 
NGOs are allocated specific districts in Nepal. This 
prevents the use of earthquake science in deciding where to 
prioritise earthquake risk reduction activities. In addition, 
NGOs often have particular missions and mandates, such 
as a focus on children, and must work within these.
Despite the presence of internationally recognised 
scientists who are active in research in Nepal, donor-funded 
science is largely undertaken by international consultants. 
To some extent, this reflects a perceived lack of technical 
capacity among local scientists (including scientific 
knowledge and project management), the persistence of 
existing networks of known and trusted scientists that 
donors call upon, and concerns around the potential 
for political bias. There is also minimal investment by 
donors in more fundamental earthquake science. This 
reflects their priorities (e.g. poverty alleviation), remit 
and short-term programming needs. The government also 
gives low priority to the production of earthquake science. 
Although some government interviewees expressed an 
interest in linking better with scientists and academics, 
there is no government funding for foundational work 
or policy-oriented research. The NSC is relatively poorly 
funded, partly reflecting the focus of the DMG – which 
sits within the Ministry of Industry – on mining and oil 
exploration. The NSC also faces severe challenges in 
recruiting and retaining sufficient skilled personnel. All 
of these factors result in insufficient development, and 
prioritisation, of domestic earthquake science.
Earthquake science has given rise to effective high-
level messages around primary earthquake hazard. At 
present, however, earthquake science cannot resolve 
spatial variations in primary earthquake hazard across 
Nepal, nor predict the timing of earthquakes. Thus, the 
high-level messages are widely used conceptually and 
politically, evolve only slowly in the face of new science, 
and are highly robust (e.g. plate tectonics implies that a 
large earthquake could be felt at any location in Nepal 
at any time). There is a contradictory sense among the 
DRR community that science must be able to say more 
than these high-level messages, but also that it cannot 
address the questions that really need to be answered 
(e.g. when and where the next earthquake will occur). 
Curiously, there has been little uptake of, or appreciation 
for, the understanding that has been gained by recent 
paleoseismological investigations along the HFT, including 
the fact that Mw 8 or larger earthquakes, like that in 1934, 
have a 500-700 year return time (Ader et al., 2012), or that 
the 1255 and 1934 earthquakes shared many similarities 
(Sapkota et al., 2013). Earthquake scientists could better 
serve the DRR community by agreeing these messages 
and communicating the consensus view in a way that the 
community can understand.
At the same time, it must be recognised that most 
primary earthquake science does not, on its own, 
provide new insights that are directly relevant for DRR. 
As in all areas of science, primary earthquake science 
matures through a large body of work pursuing varied 
interests. Taken in isolation, much of this work is not 
directly relevant to policy or practice, but without it our 
understanding of earthquakes would not move forward. It 
is essential, however, that earthquake scientists engage in 
dialogue around DRR to communicate the current state of 
the science in high-level messages.
The nature of earthquake science that is, or can be, 
produced differs between primary and secondary hazards. 
Most of the focus of existing earthquake science in 
Nepal is on the extent, magnitude and timing of previous 
earthquakes, on patterns and levels of shaking, and on the 
direct impacts of that shaking on infrastructure. There is 
much less information on landslide occurrence, despite 
wide recognition and understanding of the importance of 
landsliding among focus group participants. There was 
little consensus on key issues, such as how many landslides 
would be triggered in a future earthquake or where they 
would be concentrated, and there has been little published 
information on how these issues could be addressed. While 
there are national-scale landslide hazard maps, such as 
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those produced by the ADPC (2010), these are focused 
on rainfall-triggered landslides and their relevance to 
secondary earthquake hazard is not clear. In addition, these 
national-scale products suffer from the same lack of spatial 
resolution as the hazard maps.
The science around secondary hazards can resolve 
spatial variability at a much finer scale than is the case 
for the primary hazard. For example, it is possible to 
predict the pattern of earthquake-related liquefaction or 
landslide hazard at the scale of a single valley or village. 
Communities also typically have much greater familiarity 
with secondary hazards such as landsliding, due to their 
regular occurrence in the mountainous areas of Nepal, 
than primary hazards such as ground shaking. There is 
therefore a great deal of potential for instrumental use of 
science around secondary hazards (in land-use planning, 
for example). On this basis, there is a strong obligation 
for the landslide community to interact with the DRR 
community and to undertake research that is relevant to 
policy and practice.
Practitioners are not clear in their articulation of 
the earthquake science that could usefully inform their 
operational needs. Practitioners were often critical of the 
focus of the science being undertaken or the questions 
being addressed by the science community. However, in 
response to direct questions from scientists about their 
operational needs or offers to work on questions driven 
by these needs, the practitioners were unable to provide 
these. To some extent, this reflects a lack of clarity on 
what the science could provide and the types of questions 
that it could help to answer. As a result, most donors and 
practitioners do not know what questions to ask.
Retaining earthquake risk reduction capacity in-country 
is difficult. This applies to Nepali seismologists, geologists 
and geomorphologists, and civil engineers. There are 
strong incentives for academics and technical professionals 
to seek career progression abroad at higher profile and 
better paying institutions. Employment in India, the 
Middle East and elsewhere is more highly paid than in 
Nepal. These factors make it difficult for both government 
and the private sector to retain skilled staff and places 
a disincentive on training, with a large proportion of 
graduates then leaving the country (a common problem 
in many sectors). The same drivers concentrate technical 
expertise in the main cities in Nepal, reducing the technical 
capacity within rural districts.
There are excellent examples of international 
collaboration for earthquake science. There are some 
perceptions that international scientists use Nepal and 
the Nepali scientific community in an ‘extractive’ manner. 
However, there are also a number of examples of Nepali 
scientific institutions such as the NSC benefiting from 
partnerships with foreign institutions. These have typically 
grown organically and are based on individuals and 
personal relationships, but nonetheless have proven an 
important source of equipment as well as (temporary) staff.
4.3 Linking and intermediation
The national NGO NSET and engineers working in 
government and international development partners 
are the primary ‘knowledge intermediary’ actors. A 
knowledge intermediary is an actor at the interface 
between knowledge and policy – either as an explicit part 
of their job description, or through the course of their 
regular work programme. NSET was seen by the majority 
of interviewees as the main broker and communicator 
of earthquake science to non-expert audiences – both 
communities and policy-makers. The other main actors 
who play an intermediary function are individuals with 
engineering or scientific qualifications working in policy 
or communication roles specifically. Examples of the 
latter include science journalists or communications 
specialists within organisations, such as the NRRC 
Communications Platform. 
Good research–policy links largely depend on personal 
relationships and networks. This is typical for the research–
policy links across many sectors in Nepal – in many 
cases, formal policy processes and products have lower 
relevance than informal interactions and relationships. 
Where experts are well linked into policy and political 
circles, this presents various opportunities for making 
recommendations that may get taken up. Many Nepali 
academics are seen as ‘politicised’, with a presumption that 
messages and recommendations stem from vested interests. 
A degree of politicisation may be helpful, however, in 
ensuring that knowledge and recommendations are taken 
up by stakeholders. 
Overall, there seem to be poor individual and 
institutional linkages between actors. This is especially 
the case across the science–policy divide – there seem 
to be weak links between Nepali academics engaged 
in earthquake science and government bureaucrats, 
politicians and international development partners through 
formal policy processes. It was frequently reported that 
key decision-makers were not aware of who worked 
on earthquake science in Nepal. In addition to this, 
poor institutional coordination (among universities, 
international development partners, donor organisations 
and NGOs) for earthquake risk reduction, and rules 
preventing government from working closely with NGOs, 
present further challenges.
The NRRC is a marked exception to the lack of 
institutional coordination. The NRRC is seen by a large 
proportion of stakeholders as a relatively functional forum 
for coordination and collaboration. There is some criticism 
that it is too driven by international development partners 
(Jones et al., 2014), with Nepalis under-represented 
in the staffing, and that NSET, as the strongest Nepali 
voice in earthquake risk reduction, is not comfortably 
integrated. It does, however, provide a crucial forum for 
linking governmental and NGO actors and for bridging 
research, policy and practice. There are other institutional 
mechanisms for coordination at the national level, such as 
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the Disaster Preparedness Network, a network of national 
NGOs working in the field of disaster preparedness, and the 
DMG’s mapping committee, which is in theory required to 
approve all hazard maps. However, these were considered 
less functional and lack the capacity to play a leading role.
There remain some major challenges in accessing 
earthquake science and related products. Some attempts 
to create a knowledge ‘hub’ for earthquake science in 
Nepal are underway, led by MoHA and UNDP. The 
knowledge base is fragmented, however, and there are 
few direct incentives for the communication of research 
for policy and practice. Academic incentives in Nepal, as 
elsewhere, are geared towards publishing in peer-reviewed 
journals speaking to an international audience. As a result, 
earthquake science is typically communicated in outlets 
and languages that are inaccessible to the DRR community. 
The rise of the impact agenda in the UK and elsewhere, 
driven both by research funding agencies and by the higher 
education sector as a whole, may help to address this issue 
by providing incentives for more effective communication 
and uptake of earthquake science, and by encouraging 
more innovative collaborations and partnerships between 
scientists and stakeholders.
Promisingly, there are a handful of reports that are 
extremely widely known and well-referenced. Studies such 
as JICA (2002), and the science base that underpins the 
NBC, seem to have become common artefacts – accepted 
by all as established knowledge and widely referenced. In 
many cases it is unclear what led to the success of these 
particular products as opposed to others, but it does speak 
to the potential of establishing ‘consensus’ products.
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5. Recommendations
Strengthening the usage of earthquake science for DRR 
in Nepal will require simultaneous and sustained efforts 
in demand, supply and intermediation of knowledge. 
Demand needs to be better articulated, supply needs to 
be better matched to demand and better communicated, 
and the key intermediaries – NGOs, engineers and urban 
planners who could make direct use of earthquake science 
– need to be better involved. The varied drivers of and 
constraints on the use of science by different stakeholder 
groups (e.g. government versus non-government actors; or 
stakeholders engaged in risk reduction versus preparedness 
and response) make it difficult to provide one-size-fits-all 
recommendations. We therefore summarise our findings 
from the focus groups into a series of observations and 
recommendations below.
5.1 For earthquake science producers
The majority of cutting-edge earthquake science is unlikely 
to be relevant to policy-makers and practitioners engaged 
in DRR who face multiple, competing pressures on their 
time. Scientists need to avoid swamping practitioners with 
detail and instead identify key messages that are essential 
for planning. These messages also need to be packaged in 
the right way (i.e. prepared for a lay audience, targeted at a 
problem, and accompanied by guidelines for their use). To 
achieve this, it is necessary to identify willing interlocutors 
within the end-user groups who recognise the contribution 
that the science could make, and who understand how to 
gain access to the right decision-makers. Scientists should 
make themselves available to enter into dialogues with 
stakeholders and to be guided by the needs of potential 
users of earthquake science. Scientists could also work 
more collaboratively with stakeholders in Nepal, piloting 
and testing recommendations with local communities and 
intermediaries such as engineers and NGOs.
While science has the potential to deliver useful 
products to support DRR, some products – such as 
national-scale hazard maps – have been found to have 
limited application or uptake among end users. A stock-
take to understand what is currently being used by the user 
community, what is needed, and the appropriate scales at 
which information is required would reduce the likelihood 
of this happening. 
The historical focus of earthquake contingency planning 
on the Kathmandu Valley ignores the potential for both 
acute and long-term disruption to large areas of the country 
from a future large earthquake. While there are political 
and logistical reasons to focus on the Kathmandu Valley, 
experience from the 2015 Gorkha earthquake sequence 
shows that earthquakes will have major, but foreseeable, 
impacts on other parts of Nepal, with the specific impacts 
varying among Terai, hill and mountain districts. Thus, the 
scientific knowledge required to address the earthquake 
risk in Kathmandu may differ from that required to 
address earthquake risk elsewhere in the country. A suite 
of scenarios, affecting both the Kathmandu Valley as well 
as other parts of Nepal, would allow a fuller range of 
earthquake science to be used for planning purposes.
There is generally some consensus among scientists 
around both previous earthquakes and future earthquake 
hazard. This consensus may not be clear to non-scientists, 
and it may be expressed in language that makes it hard for 
non-scientists to see the core messages. Communicating 
this consensus, and the confidence with which it is held, 
is important for promoting the wider use of science. For 
example, following the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, scientists 
quickly arrived at a consensus on what had happened in 
the earthquake and the implications for the earthquake 
hazard context moving forward. This consensus view 
did not reach many of the key decision-makers, however, 
who were instead subjected to a seemingly confused and 
contradictory array of scientific messages.
5.2 For earthquake science users
Practitioners and policy-makers should recognise that 
there is a large community of scientists, both Nepali 
and international, with scientific knowledge of both 
primary and secondary earthquake hazards in Nepal. 
The overwhelming majority of these scientists want their 
science to be relevant and useful for DRR activities – in 
other words, they want to ‘make a difference’ – but they 
may not be aware of what needs to be communicated, 
or how that communication can best be achieved. 
Engagement with that community, rather than over-
reliance on outside consultants, would greatly aid 
its development and would support the national and 
international collaborations that have generated much of 
the scientific understanding of earthquake hazard.
In order to make use of the earthquake science that 
is available and to motivate useful earthquake science in 
future, practitioners need to be both willing and able to ask 
earthquake scientists questions.
Clear articulation of DRR policy drivers, constraints, 
priorities and time scales would be very beneficial in 
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helping to determine where and how earthquake science 
can be used more effectively. For example, definition of 
priority areas for DRR activity would help scientists to 
identify key messages and outputs from their research.
Science could be used to inform DRR in some areas 
where it is not used at present. For example, the locations 
and potential impacts of landslides could be included in 
reconstruction guidelines or building codes, in addition to 
primary seismic shaking. Practitioners should also recognise 
that research into secondary hazards, such as landsliding 
and liquefaction, has the potential to provide information 
at scales that are relevant to community vulnerabilities 
and needs, thus providing a mechanism for incorporating 
scientific knowledge into community-based DRR efforts.
Practitioners could usefully work with scientists 
to develop robust ways of assessing and mapping 
vulnerability as well as hazard. 
5.3 For intermediaries
Intermediaries need to recognise their critical role in the 
use of science for DRR, and be prepared to take up a 
considerable set of challenges. They need to be aware of 
the latest science, and engage with scientists as appropriate 
to address their own limitations or gaps. They also need 
to be aware of practitioner needs, activities and initiatives, 
and be ready to assist in the translation of knowledge.
5.4 General recommendations
There is a need for a sustainable, government-led science 
advisory group, composed of national and international 
earthquake scientists, who could be called upon by 
potential users from the DRR community for advice at 
every stage of the disaster cycle in Nepal. This group could 
help to condense and assess available scientific information 
on earthquake hazard, and could usefully address the need 
for consensus statements (an excellent example of such 
a consensus statement was prepared by the Geological 
Survey of Iran and is available at http://earthquake.
conference.gsi.ir/en/contents/Closing-statements/Closing.
statements.html). There are several potential international 
models for such a group, including the Southern California 
Earthquake Centre (www.scec.org). The group should 
not be seen as simply an additional voice in the DRR 
community, but instead as a way to streamline the effective 
use of science within existing planning by both government 
and NGOs. The use of earthquake science in the 2015 
disaster response might be a useful entry point for this. 
The NRRC was seen as a successful mode of working 
by many of our participants, and we recommend that 
this model of explicit cooperation between government, 
donors, intermediaries and NGOs be further developed 
and extended. The model also provides a potential gateway 
for science to enter into DRR activities; it can connect 
all of the relevant users, provide clear focus areas for 
engagement around particular problems, act as a conduit 
and as a point of contact for science and scientists, help 
to identify priority areas for research, and link with 
government demand for research and analysis. 
Scenarios are an under-utilised resource for contingency 
and logistics planning. Earthquake science has the 
potential to provide both baseline information and to 
allow exploration of different possibilities – for example, 
the effects of earthquake occurrence during daytime or 
night-time hours on casualties, or the impacts of structural 
retrofitting efforts that are focused in particular districts 
or on particular building types. Scenarios also have the 
potential to identify possible impacts that are currently 
not considered, such as the effects of earthquake-triggered 
landslides. The effectiveness of these scenarios would be 
enhanced if they were consensus products from a science 
advisory group (as recommended above), including 
government representatives, that could provide a collective 
and authoritative voice, backed up by peer-reviewed 
earthquake science. 
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Annex A. Earthquake 
science
Earthquakes are caused by the relative movement of the Earth’s tectonic plates, which are large, rigid blocks of the 
Earth’s near-surface material. Although these plates are constantly moving relative to one another, their edges are usually 
locked together by friction, causing stress to build up along the plate boundaries. Where continental plates are colliding 
with each other, such as the India-Asia collision zone, the plate boundaries comprise many individual features known as 
faults, each of which separates different blocks of the Earth’s crust (Figure 2). Eventually, the frictional strength of one 
or several faults is overcome and the blocks on either side of fault move suddenly, with the built-up energy released as 
an earthquake. During a single earthquake, a section or ‘patch’ of the fault can slip tens of metres, while the rupture can 
extend for up to several hundred kilometres along the fault (Figure 2). Earthquakes typically last for a few seconds to a 
few minutes, but the time between earthquakes on a single fault – sometimes called the ‘recurrence interval’ – can range 
from a few years up to tens of thousands of years.
What determines the size of an earthquake?
The size of an earthquake, usually expressed as its seismic moment, is defined by the amount of energy that is released. 
This is determined by the area of the fault that ruptured during the earthquake, the amount of slip on the fault, and 
the physical properties of the rocks involved. Seismic moment is then converted into a moment magnitude, commonly 
abbreviated as Mw, which provides a simple and convenient numerical scale with which to compare earthquakes.
How are the likely size and frequency of future earthquakes estimated?
The size and frequency of future earthquakes can be estimated by either examining the size and frequency of past 
earthquakes from historical and instrumental records and from pre-historical geological evidence (paleoseismology), or 
by using measuring techniques – such as GPS or satellite radar interferometry – to estimate the rates at which plates are 
moving and thus infer how and where stress is accumulating. Both approaches provide some insight into the potential 
size of future earthquakes and how often they may be expected to occur on average. It is not currently possible, however, 
to predict where and when a particular earthquake will happen, or how large it will be. Instead, scientists may be able to 
use these techniques to identify specific areas where stress is likely to be accumulating and therefore where the likelihood 
of an earthquake may be higher.
What is the difference between magnitude and intensity?
Moment magnitude measures the energy released by an earthquake, and is expressed as an Arabic number (e.g. Mw 
8.2). Intensity is a measure of how that energy release is experienced at the surface, and how it affects people and 
infrastructure at a given location. It is ranked on a qualitative scale, based for example on observations of damage 
to different types of buildings, and is sometimes expressed as a Roman numeral (e.g. intensity IX). Importantly, the 
magnitude of a particular earthquake is the same, irrespective of location, whereas the intensity of the earthquake varies 
from place to place. This means that a location can experience the same intensity from a large-magnitude earthquake that 
is far away, or a smaller earthquake that is nearby.
Is Nepal ever overdue for an earthquake?
No, in the sense that earthquakes do not follow a regular pattern in time, so they are never ‘due’ or ‘overdue’. For 
example, the Himalayan Frontal Thrust fault in Nepal must absorb most of the relative motion between the Indian 
and Eurasian plates, and it does so by repeated, large (i.e. Mw 8 or larger) earthquakes. The time between individual 
earthquakes, however, can vary from a few years to many hundreds of years. 
What is seismic hazard and how is it measured?
Seismic hazard is a measure of the potential damaging effects of some future earthquake at a specific location. These 
effects are often, but not exclusively, due to the shaking caused by the earthquake. Besides ground shaking, other 
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processes, such as landslides and liquefaction, can form important ‘secondary hazards’ triggered by the earthquake. 
Shaking can be expressed qualitatively in terms of intensity, or quantitatively in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA). 
PGA is the maximum acceleration that the ground surface experiences during an earthquake, and is usually given as a 
fraction of the Earth’s gravitational acceleration (g). Generally speaking, a PGA of about 0.001 g is perceptible by people, 
a PGA of around 0.2 g causes most people to lose their balance, and a PGA of around 0.7 g will cause the collapse of all 
but the best-designed buildings (Worden et al., 2012).
How does local geology affect shaking?
Shaking during an earthquake is caused by the passage of seismic waves through the Earth. These waves are produced 
by slip on the fault, and travel away from the fault in all directions. The shaking at any particular point depends on size 
of the waves, and thus in part on the conditions along the pathway that the waves take to that point. Different types 
of rock, and the interactions between the waves and topography, can cause the waves to either be amplified (leading to 
locally greater shaking and intensity) or attenuated (leading to decreased shaking and intensity). For example, cities built 
in basins filled with soft sediment, like Kathmandu, often experience greater intensities than nearby areas on bedrock, 
both because the seismic waves are amplified by the sediment and because the waves are reflected off the bedrock at the 
edges of the basin. 
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Figure 2. Schematic of a plate boundary where two plates are colliding 
Fault A
Plate 1
Plate 2
Fault B
Rupture
In this simplified example, two faults (A and B) are visible at the surface, and form the boundary. The relative motion between the two plates 
(large black arrows) causes earthquakes along the surface of the Earth, as shown by the heavy black line.
What is involved in a seismic hazard assessment?
An assessment of seismic hazard involves understanding the sources that generate earthquakes in a region (i.e. the location, 
size and type of fault), and the characteristics of those earthquakes (e.g. frequency of occurrence and maximum magnitude). 
Data from past earthquakes are then used to predict how those sources produce shaking at a particular location. 
Seismic hazard assessment often takes one of two forms:
 • Deterministic seismic hazard assessment (DSHA) consists of estimating the level of ground shaking associated with 
a particular earthquake – for example, the PGA associated with a Mw 8 earthquake on a particular section of the 
Himalayan Frontal Thrust fault. This approach is scenario specific, which can help decision-makers visualise the 
potential impacts of an earthquake. A problem with this approach, however, is that there are many candidate faults 
that could affect a given location, so it is difficult to design a comprehensive set of scenarios.
 • Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) consists of estimating the probability that a certain level of ground 
shaking will be exceeded within a given time period at the location of interest. Unlike DSHA, PSHA takes into account 
multiple scenarios associated with earthquakes on multiple faults, and so must express the hazard in probabilistic 
terms. For example, a given location might have a 10% probability that PGA will exceed 0.1 g within 50 years, or in 
other words the return period for shaking greater than 0.1 g is 475 years. PSHA can be conducted for a single location 
or a larger area, depending on its intended use (e.g. to inform building codes).
What is probabilistic seismic risk?
To understand the full effects of an earthquake, seismic hazard assessment must be combined with some understanding of 
how the earthquake will impact upon people and infrastructure to create risk. Probabilistic seismic risk is the probability 
of some adverse consequence (e.g. damage to buildings, human casualties or monetary losses) occurring due to the 
hazard. Accurate assessments of risk depend on reliable estimates of seismic hazard, exposure and vulnerability.
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Annex B. Evidence-
informed policy-making: 
key terms
Policy. We define policy in its broadest sense to include the following (Jones and Villar, 2008; Keck and Sikkink, 1998): 
 • Content: This refers to what is traditionally seen as ‘policy’. Policy content includes strategies and plans; specific 
proposals for action, including regulation; economic instruments, such as subsidies or taxes; and programmes of 
legislation and budgets. It also includes voluntary negotiated standards, risk governance, decisions about the allocation 
of public funds, and the provision of information to ‘win hearts and minds’ (Shaxson, 2009).
 • Procedures: These refer to the way policy processes are undertaken, the way decisions are made, the spaces for 
dialogue and the groups of people who are invited to take part.
 • Behaviours: These refer to the way that policy actors at all levels of governance behave, act or relate to others.
 • Discourse: This refers to the labels or narratives used by policy actors to describe certain issues, for example in relation 
to the recognition of specific groups of people or endorsements of international declarations.
 • Attitudes: These refer to the way policy actors think about a given issue, the way a debate is framed and the awareness, 
attitudes or perceptions of key stakeholders. 
Governance refers to ‘the definition of issues, the formation of policies and the introduction of measures to mitigate 
undesirable consequences’ (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003: 144). Understanding the governance context for DRR therefore 
requires an understanding of the stakeholders involved (not only those engaged directly in DRR but also those from 
other, perhaps seemingly unrelated, sectors), the relationships among them and the role of power in these relationships; 
the institutional and legislative context for DRR; and the incentives and disincentives that affect the decisions of 
stakeholders engaged in DRR (Jones et al., 2016).
Knowledge. Perkin and Court (2005: 2) define knowledge as ‘information that has been evaluated and organised so 
that it can be used purposefully’. This can include research, statistical data, citizen or stakeholder perspectives, as well 
as evaluative information. The process through which knowledge is evaluated and organised, however, will be strongly 
influenced by power dynamics, values and beliefs. Knowledge is therefore not an external input to the policy process, and 
its production and use are interwoven with the politics and power dynamics of policy-making (Jones et al., 2012). 
Knowledge intermediaries are organisations or individuals that operate across the knowledge–policy–practice interface 
(Jones et al., 2012). Knowledge intermediaries manage the ‘boundaries between knowledge and action in ways that 
simultaneously enhance the salience, credibility and legitimacy of the information they produce’ (Cash et al., 2003: 8086). 
They may have a job dedicated to this function, or may occasionally act as knowledge intermediaries in the course of 
their regular work (Jones et al., 2012). In either case, the role requires effective two-way communication.
Knowledge utilisation. Scientific knowledge is used in different ways by different people or groups. The large body 
of research into how knowledge is used in policy processes has identified a number of different types of knowledge 
utilisation (e.g. Weiss, 1979). We will use a typology of knowledge use drawing mainly on Johnson (1998), which includes 
instrumental or direct use, conceptual use and political use.
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Instrumental or direct use is the utilisation of knowledge, derived in our case from earthquake science, in order to modify 
the design of a policy proposal, as an input to manage a programme at the operational level (Johnson, 1998) or in the 
creation of a specific tool that draws on this science (e.g. Kramer and Wells, 2005).
Conceptual or indirect use is a substantial change in how actors in the policy process perceive or understand the policy 
issue (Johnson, 1998). In our case, this change is induced by new knowledge presented by earthquake science. This can 
happen quickly, or over a long period of time as the stock of scientific knowledge accumulates. Scientific knowledge 
in this case might create debate and dialogue, possibly refocusing existing debates or causing other shifts in the 
understanding of a particular programme or area of work.
Political or legitimating use is the utilisation of knowledge generated by earthquake science in order to justify a political 
position (Rissi and Sager, 2013) or to persuade others to change theirs (Kramer and Wells, 2005). Earthquake science can 
thus be an instrument to support prior beliefs and preferred policy options, legitimise previous actions or prevent future 
actions (Rissi and Sager, 2013). The same piece of earthquake science may even be used by different stakeholders to 
support different positions (Johnson, 1998). Some authors have raised concerns about political misuse of knowledge (e.g. 
Patton, 2008; Hertin et al., 2009).
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